Trial Practice - Judge and Jury - Absence of Counsel by Murphy, Joseph A.
Duquesne Law Review 
Volume 5 Number 3 Article 14 
1966 
Trial Practice - Judge and Jury - Absence of Counsel 
Joseph A. Murphy 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Joseph A. Murphy, Trial Practice - Judge and Jury - Absence of Counsel, 5 Duq. L. Rev. 458 (1966). 
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol5/iss3/14 
This Recent Decision is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. 
DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
difficulty separating testimony from advocacy, and (2) trial counsel
would not be placed in the awkward position of arguing his own credi-
bility. Thus, two of the reasons for refusing to permit an attorney-witness
to act as trial counsel do not apply to the situation where trial counsel is
a partner of the attorney-witness. There still remains the argument ,that
the partner-witness has an interest in the outcome of the case and thus
might be tempted or pressured to mold his testimony into a form most
favorable to the client of his firm. However, this interest argument can be
made of many witnesses, yet their testimony is permitted, subject to
attack as to credibility. It is submitted that the argument of interest,
standing alone, should not justify the exclusion of an attorney as trial
counsel in a case wherein his partner will appear as a material witness. It
is doubtful that the image of the profession will be damaged in such cases.
The present Canons of Ethics have undergone considerable criticism
in recent years and a special committee has been created by the American
Bar Association to re-evaluate and possibly revise the Canons. 6 At this
time it cannot be determined whether the special committee has decided to
alter Canon 19 or to reconsider the position taken in Opinion No. 220. It
is submitted that the present position is the correct one. However, in
view of the Wiekerer dicta, the committee should consider the problem
again and restate Canon 19 in accordance with its decision.
John Ralph Kenrick
TRIAL PRACTICE-Judge and Jury-Absence of Counsel-In a recent
series of decisions the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has ruled that any
communication by the judge with the jury other than in open court and
in the presence of counsel for all parties requires reversal notwithstand-
ing the absence of prejudice.
Gould v. Argiro, 422 Pa. 433, 220 A.2d 654 (1966). Kersey Mfg. Co. v.
Rozic, 422 Pa. 564, 222 A.2d 713 (1966). Yarsunas v. Boros, 423 Pa.
364, 223 A.2d 696 (1966).
During its deliberations in Gould v. Argiro,' the jury sent two requests for
further instructions to the trial judge who informed them by return note
to only utilize the testimony given by the witnesses in the case. Neither
36. Powell, The President's Page, 50 A.B.A.J. 1005 (1964). For a general discussion of
the problems which may be considered by the special committee see Swindler, Toward a
Restatement of Professional Ethics, 27 U. PITT. L. Rav. 795 (1966), and Cheatham, Sutton,
Sears, Armstrong, Watson, Johnstone, Elson, Thode, and Weckstein, Re-evaluation of the
Canons of Professional Ethics: A Symposium, 33 TENN. L. RFv. 129 (1966).
1. Gould v. Argiro, 422 Pa. 433, 220 A.2d 654 (1966). Argued on May 25, 1966; decided
on June 24, 1966.
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counsel was present for this exchange nor was any effort made to contact
them. The jury request and the judge's reply were not made a part of the
record. Appellees argued that the jury verdict should not be vacated
without a showing of prejudice. On appeal, the supreme court reversed;
held, any instruction by the trial judge to the jury in the absence of
counsel requires a new trial notwithstanding the absence of prejudice.
Mr. Justice Cohen, speaking for the majority of the court, pointed out
that the potential impediment to a fair proceeding inherent in these
practices necessitated a new trial, that the showing-of-prejudice rule has
been undermined by the more recent case of Glendenning v. Sprowls2 and
that additionally, any instruction of which there is no record is always
objectionable.
The jury in Kersey Mfg. Co. v. Rozic' also sent a note to the trial judge
asking, in effect for additional advice. The judge was away from the court-
room at the time. When he was informed of the note by the court crier,
the judge instructed him by phone to send a note back to the jury ad-
vising them to continue deliberating and to come to a decision to the best
of their judgment. Again, neither attorney knew of the jury's note nor of
the judge's response until after the verdict was returned for defendant;
in addition, it was not until five months later that the note was made a part
of the record. The superior court held that the showing-of-prejudice rule
did not apply to innocuous jury communications, such as existed in the
case at hand.' The supreme court reversed and remanded; held, that
any communication between a judge and jury, including harmless mes-
sages, other than in open court and counsels' presence requires reversal
per se.
Mr. Justice Jones arrived at this conclusion by tracing the case law in
the area, relying to a great extent on the language in Gould v. Argiro.'
His opinion, however, criticized the showing-of-prejudice rule more
directly than Argiro by stating that since there was simply no way of
determining the influence of such communications on the jury, the safest
course would be to avoid all questions by requiring all jury deliberations
to be conducted in the utmost privacy. Justice Jones also specifically held
that the per se rule applies to both instructions and communications,
thereby abolishing in Pennsylvania a distinction that many other State
courts assiduously make.
2. 405 Pa. 222, 226, 174 A.2d 865, 867 (1961). "We strongly condemn any intrusion by a
Judge into a jury room during the jury's deliberations, or any communication by a Judge
with the jury without prior notice to counsel, and such practice must be immediately
stopped !" Note the firmness of the mandate.
3. Kersey Mfg. Co. v. Rozic, 422 Pa. 564, 222 A.2d 713 (1966). Argued on April 19,
1966; decided on September 27, 1966.
4. Kersey Mfg. Co. v. Rozic, 207 Pa. Super. 182, 215 A.2d 323 (1965) (two judges
dissenting).
5. 422 Pa. 433, 220 A.2d 654 '(1966).
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In the third case, Yarsunas v. Boros,6 the jury also sent a note to the
trial judge inquiring about a possible connection between the attorneys
and an insurance company. The trial judge replied by note that the jury
was to only consider the matters on which they were charged. Neither
attorney was present at the time; in this case, however, the note was
properly made a part of the record. The plaintiff moved for a new trial
on the strength of Gould v. Argiro, which had been recently decided.
Defendant appealed from the granting of the motion but the supreme
court affirmed; held, Gould v. Argiro' and Kersey Mfg. Co.' are re-
affirmed and followed.
While recognizing that these two decisions controlled, Mr. Justice
Eagen further analyzed the majority's reason for disapproving the show-
ing-of-prejudice rule:
Such a rule would surely lead to confusion and inconsistent
results. Further, past experience dictates that guidelines for
trial judges, in this respect, be fixed and clear in order that all
possible prejudice to litigant's causes be completely elimi-
nated.' °
In each of these decisions, the supreme court was divided. Mr. Chief
Justice Bell and Mr. Justice Musmanno dissented in Gould v. Argiro."
However, in Kersey Mfg. Co. v. Rozic,12 only Mr. Chief Justice Bell
dissented with Mr. Justice Roberts filing a concurring opinion. In the
final decision,'" the minority members of the court appeared together for
the first time with dissenting opinions by Mr. Chief Justice Bell and
Justices Roberts and Musmanno.
The Chief Justice's opinion is that the showing-of-prejudice rule should
only be applied to an instruction to the jury "as that term has always been
used and understood."14 Mr. Justice Musmanno's position is that the
majority's concern for a per se rule in the area is "Much Ado About
Nothing."" Mr. Justice Roberts' position has evolved from the majority
6. Yarsunas v. Boros, 423 Pa. 364, 223 A.2d 696 (1966). Argued on October 3, 1966;
decided on November 15, 1966.
7. 422 Pa. 433, 220 A.2d 654 (1966).
8. Ibid.
9. 422 Pa. 564, 222 A.2d 713 (1966).
10. 423 Pa. 364, 367, 223 A.2d 696, 697 (1966).
11. 422 Pa. 433, 220 A.2d 654 (1966).
12. 422 Pa. 564, 222 A.2d 713 (1966).
13. 423 Pa. 364, 223 A.2d 696 (1966).
14. Id. at 367, 223 A.2d at 698. It is noteworthy that Mr. Chief Justice Bell authored
the majority opinion in Glendenning v. Sprowls, 405 Pa. 222, 174 A.2d 865 (1961), upon
which the current majority relies as past support for its rule.
15. Gould v. Argiro, 422 Pa. 433, 437, 220 A.2d 654, 656 (1966).
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in Argiro'6 to the minority in Yarsunas;17 in Kersey, 8 he concurred be-
cause of the presence of prejudice but vigorously objected to the major-
ity's prophylactic rule since he saw no justification for a rule that would
only create "much mischief" in the lower courts.
This division within the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reflects the
division between State courts as a whole, particularly in the area of
additional instructions."9 One State court in concluding that the showing-
of-prejudice rule was the better one undertook to collect and examine
the various views in the United States and stated:
Only a few jurisdictions remain that follow the strict rule that
any communication is error whether prejudicial or not and that
such error is cause for reversal. The majority of modern de-
cisions follow the trend of liberalizing the rule to the extent
that, if error is not prejudicial, then a new trial ought not to be
granted or a judgment reversed. °
It is noteworthy that some States have statutes which require reversal
only if a defect which prejudices the substantial rights of the defendant
exists.2 Pennsylvania has no such statute; however, even if one existed,
it is submitted that no different result would be reached in the instant
cases for jury communications in the absence of counsel could be easily
interpreted as affecting the substantial rights of a party.
The latter reason is the principal one advanced by the Federal system in
adhering to the per se rule.12 Recently, the United States Supreme Court
had occasion to suggest its rationale in the broad area of jury communica-
tions in a decision wherein a bailiff made statements about a defendant
16. Id. at 433, 220 A.2d at 654.
17. 423 Pa. 364, 223 A.2d 696 (1966).
18. 422 Pa. 564, 222 A.2d 713 (1966).
19. 89 C.J.S. Trial § 478 (1955) ; Annot. 41 A.L.R.2d 227, 288 (1955) ; Annot. 84 A.L.R.
211 (1933).
20. State v. Schifsky, 243 Minn. 533, 69 N.W.2d 89 (1955). The Court noted that prior
to:.1881, Minnesota followed the per se rule but in that year decided that the showing-of-
prejudice rule ". . . is the better and more practical rule. . . ." Oswald v. Minneapolis &
N.W. Ry. Co., 29 Minn. 5, 11 N.W. 112 (1881).
Curiously, the Minnesota Court cited Pennsylvania as following the showing-of-prejudice
rule. See note 25, infra.
21. Massachusetts, for example, has the following Statute:
No new trial shall be granted in any civil action or proceeding . . . for any error
as to any matter of pleading or procedure, if the judge who presided at the trial
when application is made by motion for a new trial, or the supreme judicial court...
deems that the error complained of has not injuriously affected the substantial
rights of the parties.
MASs. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 132 (1959). See, e.g., Runshaw v. Berstein, 347 Mass. 405, 198
N.E.2d 293 (1964).
22. Fillippon v. Albion Vein Slate Co., 250 U.S. 76 (1919) ; Arrington v. Robertson, 114
F.2d 821 (3rd Cir. 1940).
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within the hearing of a State court jury.3 In a Per Curiam decision it
ruled that "the unauthorized conduct of the bailiff involves such a prob-
ability that prejudice will result that it is deemed lacking in due pro-
cess." 24 This interpretation of the due process clause seems to be a more
adequate reason for a prophylactic rule, although it was not utilized by
Justices Cohen, Jones and Eagen in support of their position.
As indicated earlier, great reliance was placed in the majority's opinions
on past case law in Pennsylvania. What is unusual is that the past de-
cisions are conflicting.2 5 The method by which the majority chose to
show their disapproval with these conflicting cases was to explain the
inherent difficulty with the one major opinion supporting the showing-of-
prejudice rule, i.e., Mr. Justice Horace Stern's opinion in Sebastianelli v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of America.2 6 Their unwillingness, however, to specif-
ically overrule the Sebastianell27 decision allowed Mr. Justice Musmanno
to make a major argument in his Argiro2" dissent that no case cited by the
majority and least of all Glendenning v. Sprowls, 9 with its many factual
differences, is precedent for a per se rule. In spite of these differences,
however, Glendenning does contain dictum supporting such a rule.3"
Thus, it is suggested that, if any criticism of the rule is to be valid, an
approach different than finding fault with the case law should be utilized.
The general reaction to the rule developed by the three instant cases
will most likely be similar to Mr. Justice Roberts' objection that the
decision "constitutes an unnecessary reproach to the trial judge, creates
an undue hardship on the appellant and is an unneeded addition to the
trial courts' ever increasing backlog.""1 These considerations do have
23. Parker v. Gladder, 87 Sup. Ct. 468 (1966).
24. Ibid. Justice Harlan dissented in what he described as the case of an "apparently
Elizabethan-tongued bailiff" because he feared the opinion now leaves open the possibility of
automatically requiring a mistrial on constitutional grounds whenever any juror is espoused
to any potentially prejudicial expression of opinion.
25. Accord, Glendenning v. Sprowls, 405 Pa. 222, 174 A.2d 865 (1961); Hunsicker v.
Waidelich, 302 Pa. 224, 153 Atl. 335 (1931) ; Somer v. Huber, 183 Pa. 162, 38 AtI. 595 (1897).
Contra, Krywricki v. Trommer, 199 Pa. Super. 145, 184 A.2d 389 (1962), allocatur refused,
199 Pa. Super. xxx; Sapsara v. Peoples Cab Co. 381 Pa. 241, 113 A.2d 278 (1955); Sebas-
tianelli v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 337 Pa. 466, 12 A.2d 113 (1940); Altsman v.
Kelly, 336 Pa. 481, 9 A.2d 423 (1939); Allegro v. Rural Valley Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 266
Pa. 333, 112 At. 140 (1920) ; Cunningham v. Patton, 6 Pa. 355 (1847).
See also LAUB, PENNSYLVANIA TRIAL GUIDE § 157.2 and § 157.3; 6 STANDARD PENNSxL-
VANIA PRAcTIcE Ch. 24, § 78 and Ch. 26, § 81.
26. 337 Pa. 466, 12 A.2d 113 (1940).
27. Ibid.
28. 422 Pa. 433, 220 A.2d 654 (1966).
29. 405 Pa. 222, 174 A.2d 865 (1961).
30. Id. at 224, 174 A.2d at 867, "This Court has, on prior occasions, warned trial Judges
that they are not to enter the jury room or privately communicate with the jury under any
circumstances. . . ." [Emphasis added.]
31. Yarsunas v. Boros, 423 Pa. 364, 368, 223 A.2d 696, 698 (1966).
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merit but it is submitted that any inconvenience resulting from the rule
should only be minor. The recently published University of Chicago Jury
Study suggests this conclusion by disclosing that the number of occasions
on which juries request additional instructions is infrequent.3 2 In fact,
the Study gives additional support to the majority's per se rule by pointing
out that when juries do make such additional requests, they are most
often concerned with the Law they are to apply.3 It would seem, there-
fore, that even if a per se rule were not set forth in a jurisdiction, it
would still be very advantageous for counsel to be present during jury
deliberations to insure that the jury is always correctly charged.
A logical question left unanswered by the three recent supreme court
opinions is whether per se rules should be adopted in other trial practice
areas where the showing-of-prejudice rule now prevails. Certainly, it can
be forcefully argued that there is simply no reliable way of determining
the existence of prejudice in any situation and that the safest course
is to follow a per se rule. Criminal cases which concern fundamental rights
of individuals would seem to more susceptible to this type of argument
than civil cases. 4 Ironically, however, the showing-of-prejudice rule seems
to have prevailed in past Pennsylvania criminal cases and Mr. Justice
Roberts points out that there is at least one area of criminal law where
there is a far greater danger of the evils the majority desire to avoid but
the rule is far less stringent.5 In view of this, therefore, it is suggested
that it is unlikely that the per se rule will automatically be introduced into
other areas of the law.
Final consideration should be given to the alternatives now available
to a trial judge in insuring that counsel will be present during all jury
deliberations. The most obvious would be to impose the absolute rule
that attorneys must hold themselves available to the court at all times.
The supreme court has stated approval of this rule in Gould v. Argiro.36
It.involves many practical problems, however, as the fact situations in
the instant cases indicate: a jury may deliberate for many hours and
32. KALVEN AND ZEI5FL, THE Ai5.mCAN JuRy 510 (1966). "On the average, it has a
question in about 1 out of every 6 deliberations. And even if the case is 'difficult,' it comes
back in only about 1 out of every 3 or 4 cases."
33. Id. at 511. "More than half of all requests concern questions on the law. . . . An-
other third of the requests concern questions of evidence."
The authors ask the "intriguing" question of whether the handling of the jury's request
has any traceable effect on its verdicts but concluded that no inference could be drawn on
this point since there were so few cases in which the judge refused to answer the jury's
question. The data indicates, however, that the chances of a hung jury are about three times
as great in cases where the jury comes back.
34. Commonwealth v. Kelly, 292 Pa. 418, 141 Adt. 246 (1928); Commonwealth ex rel.
Comer v. Maroney, 178 Pa. Super. 633, 116 A.2d 301 (1955).
35. Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Rundie, 423 Pa. 93, 223 A.2d 88 (1966).
36. 422 Pa. 433, 220 A.2d 654 (1966).
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make a request at any time of the day or evening, thereby making an
attorney's day-to-day schedule less flexible for other legal matters.87
An alternative method of solving the problem would be to allow counsel
to wajve his right to be present for any judge and jury communications.
Support for this view does exist in the Federal system." However, it is
not problem-free, in itself, for it has been stated that waivers in this area
must be strictly construed8" and, of course, there may be possible due
process problems if a criminal defendant's counsel has waived the re-
quirement of his presence for jury communications and the latter objects
or the communication is crucial in the outcome of the trial. For the
present, however, these two methods, regardless of their practical prob-
lems, seem to be the only alternatives available to trial judges to insure
compliance with the per se rule.
Overall, then, it appears that the present majority of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court considers the value of an impartial jury to be far greater
than any possible inconvenience to a trial court's docket, a lawyer's
schedule or even the swift disposal of a lawsuit."0 The opinions in the
instant decisions indicate that while some changes must necessarily occur
in trial practice, the per se rule for all jury communications is still the
better to follow. Other jurisdictions would do well to adopt a similar rule.
Joseph A. Murphy
37. In Yarsunas the jury retired to deliberate at 10:25 A.M. At 12:45 P.M., their note
was sent to the judge who answered it within ten minutes.
The jury note in Kersey was delivered at the time of the evening meal after the jury had
deliberated for more than two hours.
38. Arrington v. Robertson, 114 F.2d 821 (3rd Cir. 1940); Railway Express Agency,
Inc. v. Little, 50 F.2d 59 (3rd Cir. 1931).
39. Arrington v. Robertson, 114 F.2d 821 (3rd Cir. 1940).
40. "It has been wisely stated that 'Next to the tribunal being in fact impartial is the
importance of its appearing so.'" Shorger v. Basil, Dighton, Ltd., [19241 1 K.B. 274, 278.
"This applies in a special way to the judge and his relationship with the jury." Mr. Chief
Justice Bell in Glendenning v. Sprowls, 405 Pa. 222, 224, 174 A.2d 865, 866 (1961).
